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A LEGAL PLURALIST APPROACH TO
THE USE OF CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES IN THE
IMPLEMENTATION AND ADJUDICATION OF

HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS
Valeska Davidt
Julie Fraser*

INTRODUCTION

The assertion that state law is the law is perhaps one of the greatest
and most embedded creeds in Western legal cultures.' In practice, however,
individuals coexist among multiple communities generating and enforcing
norms. 2 Some df these norms are regarded as official law, while others are
3
considered informal or customary law (or not even law at all). While lawyers tend to focus on state-sanctioned law-the self-proclaimed only lawlegal pluralist scholars have long studied legal hybridity in a given social
field.4 In this paper, we borrow some of their insights to analyze the operation of international human rights law. The state monopoly on the production and enforcement of law has not only sidelined infra-state normative
orders, but also denied public international law (including human rights
law) the quality of law. 5 In spite of its state-sanctioned character, human
rights law retains its oddity among the law of states and unlike the latter, the

t PhD Candidate Ghent University, Belgium
t PhD Candidate Utrecht University, the Netherlands
This research has been funded by the Interuniversity Attraction Poles Programme
initiated by the Belgian Science Policy Office, more specifically the IAP 'The Global
Challenge of Human Rights Integration: Towards a Users' Perspective'
www.hrintegration.be.
1. Within scholarship on legal pluralism, there is a long and ongoing debate regarding both the definition of law and legal pluralism itself. It is beyond the scope of
this paper to address this debate. See generally Brian Z Tamanaha, UnderstandingLegal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 375 (2008).
2. Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice:Tales of Jurisdictions,14 CAP. U. L.
REV. 179, 182 (1984). He also notes that "the question of what is law and for whom is a
question of fact about what certain communities believe and whit what commitments to
those beliefs." Robert Cover, The Supreme Court. Foreword:Nomos and Narrative,97
HARV. L. REv. 4, 4-5 (1983).
3. On official and unofficial law, see, e.g., Masaji Chiba, Three Dichotomies of
Law in Pluralism:An Analytical Scheme of Legal Culture, TOKAI L. REV. 173 (1987).
4. See Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social
Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 L. & Soc'Y REV. 719, 720 (1972).
5. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 214-16 (1994).
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former can hardly deny the normative power of the multiplicity of actors
intervening in its operations. Moreover, and far from being self-contained,
the different layers or sub-regimes of a fragmented human rights law are in
constant overlap and exchange.6 As such, we subscribe to the view of international human rights law as a multilayered architecture, whereby states,
supranational organs, non-state as well as transnational and local actors, all
generate, reconstruct, and contest normative postulates.
We take a legal pluralist approach with the aim of better grasping the
challenges and opportunities in the implementation and adjudication of
human rights norms, focusing on non-dominant groups raising cultural
claims.7 On a more modest note, legal pluralist lenses may at least provide a
more realistic account of how international human rights law functions in
practice. In particular, we follow Berman when he says: "while it does not
offer substantive norms, a pluralist approach may favor procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices that provide opportunities for plural
voices." 8 And such opportunities are vitally necessary in human rights,
given the global cultural diversity existing within the system. Rather than
being one-size-fits-all, culture often plays a deterministic role in perspectives on human rights. Legal pluralist lenses are therefore helpful in understanding the link and interaction between human rights and culture as
normative orders with overlapping subject matters. Sometimes these orders
can be viewed as complementary and, at other times, as apathetic or contradictory. It is for actors, including states, judges, and international bodies
as well as civil society and local communities - to navigate and reconcile
them. Often these tasks are done in the context of human rights implementation and adjudication of specific cultural claims.

-

6. Carlos Ivdin Fuentes, Ren6 Provost & Samuel G. Walker, E Pluribus Unum

&

Bhinneka Tunggal Ika? Universal Human Rights and the Fragmentationof International Law, in DIALOGUES ON Hum. RTS. & LEGAL PLURALISM 37, 66 (Rend Provost
Colleen Sheppard eds., 2013); Barbara Oomen, The applicationof socio-legal theories
of legal pluralismto understandingthe implementation and integrationof human rights
law, 4 EUROPEAN J. Hum. RTs. 471, 493 (2014).

7. In this paper, non-dominant groups refers to (not monolithic) social groups that
have relatively less influence in the prevailing political, economic and cultural structuring of society and who normally do not stand as equal peers in social interaction. This
term is preferred over 'minorities.' Although the latter entails similar connotations, it
can be misleading when it comes to characterize certain groups, such as women.
8. Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1166
(2007).
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A wide range of actors - human rights users9 - seek entitlements, recognition, and resources by or while claiming protection of their cultural
specificity or identity in a myriad of ways. Both culture and identity tend to
evoke strong moral and normative commitments. According to Waldron,
identity claims are put forward as versions of rights. Such claims, like rights
claims, are usually presented as non-negotiable: "They represent who I am",
10
which cannot be sacrificed for the benefit of others. Thus, assertions of
culture can be, at least discursively, as powerful as rights. In this sense,
Cowan, Dembour, and Wilson have also noted that "culturalist" claims are
likely to carry more weight in adjudication processes and, therefore, they
are used strategically to justify a wide range of claims.1 ' Furthermore, since
the notion of "cultural rights" - and culture more generally - is quite flexible, its use may be especially apt to bring onto the human rights agenda
issues that would otherwise not easily fit. Almost all human rights can be
linked to culture, however there is still no agreed definition or list of cultural rights. 12 Indeed, it is submitted that the field of cultural rights is one of
the least elaborated by international human rights law, which opens up possibilities for claims that contest prevailing understandings of the social, political, cultural, and economic life.13
From a political perspective, cultural claims also hold an important
emancipatory potential. Third World scholars have observed that 'culture'
14
is being embraced "as a terrain of resistance and struggle." For Rajagopal,
the turn to culture in the 'Global South' has translated into new conceptions
of human rights for building alternatives to prevailing models of modernity,
democracy, development, and market." Yet, at the same time, post-colonialist and other critical approaches to culture and human rights underscore

&

9. See Ellen Desmet, Analysing users' trajectoriesin human rights:a conceptual
exploration and research agenda, 8 HUM. RTS. & INT'L LEGAL DISCOURSE 121, 125126 (2014).
10. Jeremy Waldron, Cultural Identity and Civic Responsibility, in CITIZENSHIP IN
DIVERSE SOCIETIES 158 (Kymlicka & Norman eds., 2000).
11. Jane K. Cowan, Marie-B6nd Dembour & Richard A. Wilson, Introduction, in
CULTURE AND RIGHTS: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 9 (Cowan et al. eds.,
2001).
12. Yvonne M. Donders, Human Rights: Eye for Cultural Diversity, ORATIEREEKS
(29 June 2012) 16, http://www.oratiereeks.nl/upload/pdf/PDF-6449weboratieDonders.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2017).
13. Rosemary J. Coombe, Legal Claims to Culture in and Against the Market:
Neoliberalismand the Global Proliferationof Meaningful Difference, I L. CULTURE
THE Hum. 35, 52 (2005).
14. See BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE 165 (2003).
15. Id. at 166, 170.
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the limitations of international human rights law to live up to its
emancipatory promise. This is largely due to the neoliberal imprint of the
existing legal frameworks and the individual justice models endowed in
human rights courts.' 6 This paper explores whether and how legal pluralist
approaches to international human rights law can facilitate some of the
emancipatory goals of claimants.
This paper analyzes the challenges and opportunities in the implementation and adjudication of human rights norms concerning cultural claims
raised by non-dominant groups through the lens of legal pluralism. It addresses both implementation and adjudication in order to thoroughly consider states' interaction with non-state law and the role of supranational
supervision. The paper is set out in three parts; the first of which explores
how acknowledging the coexistence and interaction of different normative
orders may help to more effectively implement international human rights
standards. This part looks at ways in which women's rights can be implemented by mobilizing cultural norms relating to dispute resolution and inheritance/property rights, and the supervisory role of the UN human rights
treaty bodies. The second part explores the interaction of normative orders
in relation to the adjudication of rights claims by the Inter-American and
European Courts of Human Rights. It examines how cultural rights claims
reflective of non-dominant normative comnuitments have been brought
before human rights courts and how they have been incorporated or accommodated. The paper analyzes not only a range of mechanisms that are apt to
deal with normative hybridity, but it also revises some of the challenges
posed by both the implementation and adjudication enterprises in the context of non-state cultural claims. The third part of this paper deals with this
matter. The analysis draws insights from literature and case law on human
rights, cultural diversity, and legal pluralism, as well as ethnographic studies. Without providing an exhaustive analysis, this paper illustrates the opportunities and challenges in the implementation and adjudication of
culturally related rights claims.
I.

Legal Pluralism and Human Rights Implementation

While responsibility for implementing international human rights law
formally rests on states' parties to the relevant treaties, in practice, a variety
of interacting normative orders intervene. These other normative orders can
16. See, e.g., Karen Engle, On FragileArchitecture: The UN Declarationon the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the Context of Human Rights, 22 EUROPEAN J. INT'L L.
141, 160 (2011); Ben Golder, Beyond Redemption? Problematising the Critique of
Human Rights in ContemporaryInternationalLegal Thought, 2 LONDON REV. INT'L L.
77, 111-112 (2014).
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include customary law, and social, cultural, and religious norms. In such
pluralistic settings, different actors can and do use different norms to legitimize their claims, actions, and decisions. Numerous scholars have advocated approaches to human rights that take into consideration or endeavor to
incorporate these other normative systems.1 7 Such scholars argue that by
using these approaches, international human rights can be made more concrete, relevant, and effective in local settings by being tailored to the user's
perspective. By contrast, the failure to recognize and incorporate other normative orders can be detrimental to the effectiveness of a state's human
rights measures and to the enjoyment of rights in practice. As Tamanaha
noted, "[1]aw characteristically claims to rule whatever it addresses, but the
fact of legal pluralism challenges this claim."' 8
These inclusive approaches to human rights are premised on the fact
that while conceptualized universally on the international level, in domestic
implementation rights need to be brought down to earth and made meaningful for local communities - vemacularized.1 9 This is in line with international law, which accepts that the variety of cultures and contexts in states
around the world necessitates some distinction in the manner and form of
human rights implementation. 20 Put simply: the universality of rights does
not require their uniformity in implementation. 2 1 A diversity or variety of
rights on the ground tailored to ensure their local enjoyment is "not at odds

17. See, e.g., Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Introduction, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 3-4 (Abdullahi Ahmed AnNa'im ed., 1992); Celestine I. Nyamu, How Should Human Rights and Development
Respond to CulturalLegitimization of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries?,41
CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES:

HARV. INT'L

L. J. 381, 417 (2000); Tom Zwart, Using Local Culture to Furtherthe

Implementation of InternationalHuman Rights: The Receptor Approach, 34 HUM.

RTS.

Q. 156, 157 (2012).
18. Tamanaha, supra note 1, at 375.
19. Peggy Levitt & Sally Engle Merry, Vernacularizationon the Ground: Local
Uses of Global Women's Rights in Peru, China, Indiaand the UnitedStates, 9 GLOBAL
NETWORKS 441, 441 (2009); see also Sally Engle Merry, Legal Transplants and Cultural Translation:Human Rights in the Vernacular, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL READER 265, 287 (Mark Goodale ed., 2009).
20. David Kinley, Bendable Rules: The Development Implications of Human
Rights Pluralism, in LEGAL PLURALISM AND DEVELOPMENT: SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS IN DIALOGUE 50, 51-52 (Brian Tamanaha, Caroline Sage & Michael Woolcock

eds., 2012).
21. See Cees Flinterman, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 60, 26
Q. Hum. RTS. 481, 482 (2008); Eva Brems, Reconciling Universality and Diversity in InternationalHuman Rights: A Theoreticaland MethodologicalFramework and
Its Application in the Context of Islam, 5 Hum. RTs. REV. 5, 13 (2004).
NETH.
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with maintaining human rights as a global language." 22 This flexibility is
provided for in the international human rights system, which accommodates
diversity in different ways. This section of the paper considers one such
mechanism for accommodating diversity: the subsidiarity principle and the
fact that international law does not prescribe national implementation
measures.
States parties to human rights treaties are obliged to ensure that individuals within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction benefit from
the guarantees laid down in those treaties. However, the treaties do not give
concrete instructions as to how the various rights are to be guaranteed. 2 3 For
example, Article 2(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) provides that "each State Party undertakes to take the necessary steps.. .to give effect to the rights" therein. 2 4 The UN Human Rights
Committee's has held that this Article "generally leaves it to the States Parties concerned to choose their method of implementation in their territories."25 As such, under international law, states enjoy discretion with regard
to the method of domestic implementation of their treaty obligations. 26 Galligan and Sandler note that as human rights standards are often vague and
open-ended, each state has discretion to determine what those standards
mean and what constitutes adequate compliance. 27 This, they claim, is not
an error to be remedied but rather reflects "the compromise between the
universalist claims of human rights and the imperatives of local.culture." 28
Implicitly, states are better placed than the international community to
select human rights implementation measures based on their effectiveness
in their domestic setting. On this basis, and given states' discretion, the
international system accepts that there is not one way to effectively imple22. Koen de Feyter, Treaty Interpretationandthe Social Sciences, in METHODS OF
225 (Fons Coomans, Fred GrUnfeld & Menno T. Kamminga
eds., 2009).
23. Ineke Boerefijn, International Human Rights in National Law, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 577, 579 (Catarina Krause
Martin Scheinin eds., 2009).
24. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 2(2), Dec. 16, 1966,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
25. UN Human Rights Committee, GeneralComment No. 3, "Article 2 Implementation at the National Level" ¶ 1, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 4 (July 19, 1981).
26. Nisuke Ando, National Implementation and Interpretation, THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAw 698, 702 (Dinah Shelton ed.,
2013).
27. Denis Galligan & Deborah Sandler, Implementing Human Rights, in HUMAN
&

HUMAN RIGHTS RESEARCH

RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME: Socio-LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE NATIONAL CONTEXT 23, 27-28 (Simon Halliday & Patrick Schmidt eds., 2004).

28. Id. at 28.
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ment rights, but potentially many. For example, the Convention on the
Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in
Article 3 provides that states "shall take in all fields, in particular the political, social, economic and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, including
legislation." 29 This is not just a phenomenon in the UN system but also can
be seen in regional human rights treaties, which foresee implementation by
legal as well as other measures. 30 In this way, as long as states meet their
treaty obligations, they are free to choose the most appropriate way of doing
so at the domestic level. As such, states have the possibility to employ multiple normative orders - including but not limited to state law - in the implementation of international human rights standards.
To date, however, much attention has been paid to the legal incorporation of rights into constitutions and national legislation, with the result that
the role of other measures has not been as thoroughly considered. This also
evidences the bias referred to earlier of state law as the law. Examination of
other methods of implementation is crucial given that state law may be
unsuccessful - and sometimes even counter-productive - in protecting
rights in practice. For example, implementing women's rights can be difficult when they are contrary to well-entrenched local norms. In such circumstances, state legislative measures tend to be ignored by local law enforcers
and the public alike, or rejected by particular communities. In both cases,
women-the intended beneficiaries-are often left particularly vulnerable
and unable to enjoy their rights. As such, this section explores the possibility of states using other systems of normative ordering than legislation to
realize women's rights in practice and within their cultures. This section
uses two examples relating to dispute resolution and inheritance/property
rights. It employs a legal pluralist perspective to consider how to implement
human rights standards in various communities to better accommodate cultural groups and the vulnerable among them.
A.

Non-State Dispute Resolution Mechanisms

An important aspect of legal pluralism is its recognition of multiple
systems of dispute resolution. While the state will often have dedicated formal institutions, it does not have a monopoly on dispute resolution
29. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, art. 3, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW].
30. See American Convention on Human Rights, "Pact of San Jose," Costa Rica,
art. 2, Nov. 22, 1969, 144 U.N.T.S. 1979; African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights [Banjul Charter] (Nairobi, Kenya, June 27, 1981), 21 I.L.M. 59, art. 1 (1981)
(entered into force Oct. 21, 1986).
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processes. In any given setting around the world, multiple competing options are likely to exist for resolving disputes between community members. These may include religious, social, kinship based, or formal state
mechanisms. As such, individuals can forum shop and select their dispute
resolution mechanism. Sometimes state mechanisms may be preferable if
they can better protect the relevant right or individual in question, other
times they may not. For example, the state system may be an unattractive
option if it is seen as corrupt, inefficient, or hostile by community members,
or if it is inaccessible due to its location, cost, slow process, complexity,
obscurity and/or lack of cultural sensitivity. 31 In contrast, non-state mechanisms may be familiar, readily available, affordable, efficient, and socially
legitimate. 32
While practical factors such as (in)accessibility may be persuasive, it
can also be a deliberate choice of claimants to avoid state institutions. For
example, state dispute resolution mechanisms may not be attractive for
some communities, such as in Japan, where adversarial approaches and judicial orders are not always welcomed. As Onuma notes, "one is expected
to reach the same goal by resorting to less forceful measures such as patient
negotiations, mediation, and other conciliatory measures."3 3 Similarly in
Bali, Indonesia, it is expected that "disputes should be settled in harmony,
on the basis of kinship and togetherness." 34 Many African societies also
promote reconciliation and more community based solutions to disputes. In
Vubo's research in Cameroon, members of a voluntary association proposed a variety of solutions to problems identified with their association
(such as corruption and mismanagement); however, none of them proposed
submitting to state legal procedures. It was held that resort to such procedures may "compromise the spirit of trust, fraternity, solidarity and sacrifice
31. Caroline Sage & Michael Woolcock, Introduction, in LEGAL

PLURALISM AND

DEVELOPMENT: SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS IN DIALOGUE 1, 1-2 (Brian Tamanaha,

Caroline Sage & Michael Woolcock eds., 2012); Elin Henrysson & Sandra F. Joireman,
On the Edge of the Law: Women's Property Rights and Dispute Resolution in Kisii,
Kenya, 43 LAW & Soc'y REV. 39, 49 (2009); see also Celestine Nyamu-Musembi, Are
Local Norms and PracticesFences or Pathways? The Example of Women's Property
Rights, CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 126, 137, 140,
143 (A. A. An-Na'im ed., 2002).
32. Sage & Woolcock, supra note 31, at 2.
33. Yasuaki Onuma, In Quest of Intercivilizationof Human Rights: "Universalvs.
Relative" Human Rights Viewed from an Asian Perspective, Centrefor Asian Pacific
Affairs, Asia Foundation, Occasional Paper No. 2 (1996) p. 4.
34. Ingrid Westendorp, Personal Status Law and Women's Right to Equality in
Law and in Practice:The Case of Land Rights of Balinese Hindu Women, 7 J. Hum.
RTS. PRAC. 430, 440 (2015).

2016-2017]

Cultural Perspectives in Human Rights Norms

83

-

35
that is at the basis of this type of association." These long-standing informal dispute resolution mechanisms have been adapted in contemporary
times to address widespread human rights problems. For example, the Gacacas of Rwanda were used to address the genocide in 1994, and more
recently, Nari Adalat in India are used to address violence against women.
As in many parts of the world, discrimination and violence against
women exists on a large scale in India and persists despite state attempts to
36
prevent and punish it via legislation and formal institutions. Discrimination and violence against women is a violation of women's rights under
several international human rights treaties. To address this, several initiatives were undertaken by the state and other actors, including creating the
Nari Adalat. These "women's courts" address issues including domestic vi37
olence, rape, polygamy, child custody, divorce, and dowry matters. The
petitioners are largely low caste, uneducated women, and the judges are
women from the same communities with no formal education or training
but who act as "peer mediators."38 The Nari Adalat have added another
mechanism to the pre-existing plural legal system in India, which comprises
formal state courts, village panchayats, as well as informal family and community mediation services. 39 These other pre-existing avenues are often expensive, time consuming, unfamiliar, ineffective, and even sometimes

35. Emmanuel Yenshu Vubo, On the Viability of AssociationalLife in Traditional
Society and Home-Based Associations, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE SEARCH FOR DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES IN CAMEROON 95, 119 (Emmanuel Yenshu Vubo ed., 2009).

36. CEDAW Committee, Concludingobservations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women - India, ¶I 10, 20, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/IND/
CO/4-5 (July 24, 2014); Ratna Kapur, Revisioning the Role of Law in Women's Human
Rights Struggles, in THE LEGALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PER101 (Saladin MeckledGarcfa & Bayak Cali eds., 2006); Sesha Kethineni, Murugesan Srinivasan & Suman
Kakar, Combatting Violence against Women in India: Nari Adalats and Gender-Based
Justice, 26 WOMEN & CRIM. JusT. 281, 282-85, 297 (2016).
37. Manadendra Sen & Preethi Krishnan, The Nari Adalat: A Grassroots Response to Violence and Injustice against Women, in INNOVATIONS TOWARDS EDUCATION FOR EMPOWERMENT: GRASSROOTS WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 62, 62 (Sangeetha
Purushothaman ed., 2010); Kethineni et al., supra note 36, at 286.
38. Sylvia Vatuk, The "women's court" in India: An Alternative Dispute Resolution Body for Women in Distress, 45 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 76, 77
SPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 101,

(2013).
39. Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralismand Legal Culture: Mapping the Terrain,
LEGAL PLURALISM AND DEVELOPMENT: SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS IN DIALOGUE

66, 74 (Brian Tamanaha, et al. eds., 2012).
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hostile to women's complaints. 4 0 Alternative avenues are necessary as the
"vast majority" of women suffering from domestic violence or other marital
disputes do not consider turning to the state for resolution. 4 1 The Nari
Adalat are therefore a vital addition to the plural Indian system, providing
women with an affordable, sensitive, and approachable option to resolve
disputes and have their rights upheld. 4 2
Crucial to the success of the Nari Adalat is that they enjoy local legitimacy and broad community support. Because they are embedded in and
stem from the community, the Nari Adalat have a thorough understanding
of their clients and context, including local customs and traditions. 4 3 Due to
this position, the Nari Adalat are particularly effective as they are able to
craft solutions that meet the needs of their petitioners and yet are also seen
as having legitimacy and community ownership.44 This is important because the NariAdalat rely on their local community to provide evidence in
cases, to support the appearance of the accused, and to enforce their decisions after judgment. 4 5 While they utilize some legal formalities (such as
issuing decisions on legal paper), the Nari Adalat have no state legal authority and rely exclusively on public pressure and naming and shaming. 46
Without strong community support, they could not function.
In addition to community support, the Nari Adalat also receive state
support. While outside formal state institutions, the Nari Adalat borrow
state legitimacy and receive state support, such as funding and police assistance. 47 In this way, the Nari Adalat are an example of how the state can
intervene to assist with the national implementation of human rights
through normative orders other than state laws and institutions. This could
be an example of what Zwart terms state "amplification" of grass-roots systems that work to protect and promote human rights. 48 In this case, the Nari
Adalat are modeled on the well-known informal panchayats system, but
adapted to be run by women for women with state support but not direction.
As Merry has noted, based on the inherent dynamism of culture, established
40.
note 36,
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 78-9; Sen & Krishnan, supra note 37, at 52, 64; Kethineni et al., supra
at 296.
Vatuk, supra note 38, at 81-83.
Sen & Krishnan, supra note 37, at 65.
Id. at 57-58; Vatuk, supra note 38, at 77.
Sen & Krishnan, supra note 37, at 58.
Id. at 58, 60, 63.

46. Merry, supra note 39, at 77; Sen & Krishnan, supra note 37, at 58.
47. For example, the Gujerati state provides "a sitting fee" for Nari Adalat members and the police has assisted with collecting information and pressuring perpetrators
to comply. See Merry, supra note 39, at 75; Sen & Krishnan, supranote 37, at 57, 70.
48. Zwart, supra note 17, at 558-64.
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cultural forms (like the panchayats) can be deployed in new situations and
take on new meanings. 49 Here, the Nari Adalat were able to provide for
vulnerable women in a way that the formal state law mechanisms had not
been able.
These 'women's courts' are necessary in India given the failure of the
state mechanisms to effectively address women's rights and combat domestic violence. However, questions remain regarding whether the Nari Adalat
are effective enough: Do they provide women with real, sustainable solutions - or simply ameliorate the immediate harm? While acknowledging a
degree of success, Vatuk criticizes the Nari Adalat for not sufficiently challenging patriarchal norms on marriage and women's role in society. However, the Nari Adalat's effectiveness is based on the fact that they are
accepted as legitimate within the communities where they operate. They
would likely lose this legitimacy if they radically rejected local cultural
norms in favor of promoting an incompatible version of women's rights. By
taking their current approach-a middle route-the NariAdalat can be seen
as local, credible change agents, and vital sites of intra-cultural engagement
and dialogue on sensitive issues of women' rights. As often reiterated,
change initiated from within a cultural community is more likely to be lasting and effective than change coerced by external actors-including the
state. While perhaps not an immediate solution,5 0 the Nari Adalat are an
important means of effectively implementing women's rights within their
cultural context. Like all dispute resolution mechanisms, there are limits on
the ability of the Nari Adalat to transform society. However, they have
succeeded in providing protection for women's rights where state mechanisms had failed.
B.

Non-State Regulation of Land and Inheritance

Another well-known manifestation of legal pluralism relates to the various systems in which to recognize and regulate access to and interest in
land and inheritance. Particularly in post-colonial settings, multiple normative systems co-exist and overlap for regulating land and inheritance, including customary and state law. Navigating between these systems is
important to protect one's right to land (in order to cultivate food and as a
49. Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights Law and the Demonization of Culture (And
ANTHROPOLOGY REv. 55, 69 (2003).
50. Sezgin notes the efficacy of such "gradual" measures of "revolution" or "reform" from within that are ultimately "more likely to be readily adopted" - as opposed
to top down measures by the state. Yiksel Sezgin, How to Integrate UniversalHuman
Rights into Customary and ReligiousLegal Systems, 60 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 5, 29-30 (2010).

Anthropology Along the Way), 26 POL. & LEGAL
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source of wealth), yet can also be difficult given the inconsistencies and
conflicts between the systems. For example, while a state may have legislated equality in their national legislation providing for women to inherit
and hold land, this may be inconsistent with other local systems regulating
land or family relations that limit or prevent women from owning or inheriting land.51 While in plural systems individuals can forum shop to a certain
extent regarding how to secure their interest in land and property, depending on one's location, status, and cultural belonging, there may not be much
of a choice. 52 This is particularly the case for women who may be reluctant
or unable to petition the state to protect their rights, 53 or if they do, it may
be perceived by their community as an attempt to disrupt communal values,
"gender relations, and society more generally." 54 Around the world, unequal
access to land between women and men is one of the foremost causes of
economic inequality, diminishing women as social and political actors. 55
According to human rights treaties (such as CEDAW), states parties
are obliged to guarantee women equal rights, specifically regarding property ownership. 56 This is relevant as numerous customary systems provide
for patrilineal inheritance and for men to be the sole property owners. For
example, Indonesia has a plural legal system, including formal state law and
multiple customary systems based on religion and tradition. Indonesia is a
party to CEDAW and has implemented principles of non-discrimination and
equality in its Constitution. It also has human rights legislation, which permits women to own land, hold marital property, and receive half upon divorce.5 7 Despite these state initiatives, some Indonesian women do not
51. Rwandan society is a case in point. See, e.g., Katrijn Vanhees, PhD Research
Fellow, Conference Paper Presented at the 2016 World Bank Conference on Land and
Poverty, Improving Land Rights for Women: Blind Trust in the Magic of Formal Marriage 12 (Mar. 14-18, 2016).
52. From their study of the Kisii in Kenya, Henrysson and Joireman claim that
women's only option was to use customary rather than formal dispute resolution for
land claims due to the cost. Even then, the cost may be too high for many vulnerable
women. Elin Henrysson & Sandra F. Joireman, On the Edge of the Law: Women's
PropertyRights and DisputeResolution in Kisii, Kenya, 43 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 39, 5354 (2009).
53. Customary systems may be a better venue given women's negative experiences with formal systems. Id. at 41.
54. Aili Mari Tripp, Women's Movements, Customary Law, and Land Rights in
Africa: The Case of Uganda, 7 AFRICAN STUD. Q. 1, 2, 12 (2004).
55. Id. at 6.
56. CEDAW, supra note 29, art. 2, 16(1)(h).
57. See, e.g., THE 1945 CONsTITUTIoN OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, art.
28(I)(2); Marriage Act (Act No. 1/ 1974) (Indon.); see Basic Agrarian Law (No. 5/
1960/ art. 9(2)) (Indon.); Westendorp, supra note 34, at 437-38; Ratno Lukito, The
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enjoy these rights in practice, due among other things to decentralization
and the predominance of customary law. 8 This reflects the fact that notwithstanding the official place of state law, in practice, it can fail to compete with other normative orders. 59 Other such examples exist, and scholars
have noted that ensuring women's right and access to land has long been a
problematic aspect of customary systems. 60 Rather than seeking to abolish
conflicting customary systems, or prescribing their rules from the national
level, states and other actors can work with customary systems to implement women's rights within their cultural context.
For instance, the codified customary law in Bali for the Hindu community (Adat law) provided for inheritance on a patrilineal basis. 61 However,
many within the Balinese community disagreed with these laws, were concerned for their daughters, sisters and wives' well-being, and sought to provide for their inheritance. 62 Westendorp details Balinese parents who made
arrangements for their daughters to inherit or who gifted property to their
daughters before they passed away. 63 This is an example of what Nyamu
has described, claiming that while norms are typically articulated in rigid
ways, they "will often fail to capture all of social reality."64 Nyamu argues
that notwithstanding stated cultural norms - especially ones like codified
customary law - "[1]ocal practices are varied, and people's day-to-day in65
teractions are more revealing of the 'living' cultural norms." To illustrate,
Nyamu also uses the example of women's inheritance, however in Kenya.
While Kenyan state law permits daughters to inherit, customary practice
continues to exclude women, who typically have a right to farm land but
cannot own, inherit, or control its dispossession. 66 As in Bali, despite the
Enigma of National Law in Indonesia: The Supreme Court'sDecision on Gender-Neutral Inheritance, 35

J.

LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 147, 153 (2006).

58. CEDAW Committee, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discriminationagainst Women - Indonesia, CEDAW/C/IDN/CO/6-7, [ 15
(July 27, 2012); and, Westendorp, supra note 34, at 439.
59. Tamanaha notes that sometimes state law is simply "impotent." Tamanaha,

supra note 1, at 385-386.
60. Henrysson & Joireman, supra note 31, at 41-42; see also Tripp, supra note 54,
at 3-4, 11.
61. Lukito, supra note 57, at 149; Westendorp, supra note 34, at 439.
62. Westendorp, supra note 34, at 443.
63. Id. Lukito details a similar example in the matrilineal system in Minangkabau,
where fathers would gift their estates before dying. Lukio, supra note 57, at 149.
64. Nyamu-Musembi, supranote 31, at 132-33; see also Tamanaha, supra note 1,
at 410.
65. Nyamu-Musembi, supra note 31, at 132.

66. Henrysson & Joireman, supra note 31, at 43, 45. For a discussion of similar
customary inheritance law in Uganda; see also Tripp, supra note 54, at 6.
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prevailing customary law in the Akamba community that daughters cannot
inherit, in practice there is both support for and examples of women's inheritance. 6 7 Nyamu argues that these varied practices offer a starting point to
internally challenge custom and advocate interpretations in line with human
rights principles. 68
Nyamu advocates utilizing this inherent dynamism in culture to address problematic customary practices by seeking out community-based alternatives. By working within customary arrangements, women have found
different ways to claim land through a variety of mechanisms, including
inheritance, gift, purchase, loan, lease, and through their husbands and relatives. 69 For example, there is a customary practice among the Kisii for women to gain heirs and legitimize their presence on the land known as
"daughter-in-law marriage." Under an invention of customary law, a Kisii
woman may 'marry' her fictional son to another woman with children by
paying the bride price, and then that woman becomes her daughter-in-law
and the children become her grandchildren. 70 Through these children she
can gain access to land. This is an example of culture's dynamism and how
creatively custom can be applied, and how culturally aligned variations
more compliant with human rights can be developed. In this way, women's
rights can be protected by and within cultural systems, and without state
intervention.
As a further example of dynamism, Adat law has been reformed. It
now provides for women to have half the marital property, which includes a
new form of marriage (pada gelahang), and that daughters can inherit
albeit only half that received by sons. 7 1 While such unequal inheritance is
clearly not in conformity with CEDAW, it nevertheless represents welcome
progress in Adat law. 7 2 While this change may not fully protect Balinese
women's rights, it is a positive opening that can be used to promote community dialogue and push for further reform. Nyamu encourages those
seeking human rights compliance to appropriate such positive openings, 73
arguing that the potential to realize "gender equality through local norms
67.
68.
69.
70.

Nyamu-Musembi, supra note 31, at 133-34.
See id.
Tripp, supra note 54, at 14.
Henrysson & Joireman, supra note 31, at 44-45 n.6; N. Thomas Hakansson,

The Detachability of Women: Gender and Kinship in Processes of Socioeconomic
Change among the Gusii of Kenya, 21 AMERICAN ETHNOLOGIST 516, 530 (1994).

71. Westendorp, supra note 34, at 444 (citing Decree No 01/Kep/Psm-3/MDP
BalilX/2010, MUJDP Bali, Denpasar, 15 October 2010).
72. Id.

73. Celestine Nyamu, supra note 17, at 382.
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and processes lies in the fact that local custom is in constant motion." 74 The
creation of a novel form of marriage in Adat law - pada gelahang - also
illustrates how dynamic customary law can be in responding to community
needs. Such community-based alternatives are important as they enjoy local
legitimacy and could be further employed or expanded on the basis of culture's dynamism to become new norms better protecting women's rights
within context.
Westendorp stresses the importance of local legitimacy, holding that
"cultural change is only possible if the population is convinced of the need
for it and is committed to it."'7 Many scholars have reiterated this position,
connecting the legitimacy of norms with their efficacy in practice. For example, one of the reasons why the laws changed in Bali was because an
academic and authority on Adat law engaged with the local leaders and
persuaded them of the acceptability of different forms of marriage and that
76
greater gender equality would not lead to a breakdown of Hindu identity.
Westendorp suggests that the local academic was able to do what the state
could not. Also, not to be discounted, is the agency of those individuals
within the relevant communities. Recalling culture's inherent dynamism,
Nyamu notes that people are agents of cultural transformation and can shift
norms. She argues that change is more likely if a sufficient number of (rela77
tively) powerful people in the community oppose a particular practice. To
create such a consensus for change, Nyamu recommends identifying and
organizing allies.7 8 As state officials are not best placed to influence local
norms, Westendorp submits that the state should instead rely upon - and
financially support - NGOs and individuals working to promote women's
rights.79
Whenever advocating change, considerations of power are always important. Both Nyamu and Westendorp noted that women had less power to
74. Celestine Nyamu-Musembi, supra note 31, at 127.
75. Sezgin, supra note 50, at 29 (2010) pp. 29-30; Westendorp, supra note 34, at
445.

76. Westendorp, supra note 34, at 445-46.
77. Nyamu-Musembi, supra note 31, at 135.
78. Id. An-Na'im emphasizes the necessity for advocates of alternative cultural
positions on human rights to seek broad acceptance of their position by demonstrating
"the authenticity and legitimacy of that interpretation within the framework of their own
culture." An-Na'im, supra note 17, at 4; see also Sezgin, supra note 50, at 23 (regarding building coalitions).
79. "It is important that they [NGOs] receive financial support from the Indonesian authorities, as accepting money from international sources would disqualify them
in the eyes of the locals." Westendorp (2015) at 446. See also Sezgin, supra note 50, at
30 - 31.
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influence change than men, as they are typically not well represented in
local decision-making bodies.80 This is of course not a problem limited to
customary systems, but is well-known across communities and state institutions. In such contexts it can be difficult to shift the balance in favor of
cultural attitudes benefiting women's rights. As such, it is important to promote inclusivity and the participation of women and other relatively vulnerable groups in all fora discussing and determining both state and local
norms.8 ' This may appear to be a somewhat aspirational recommendation
given that transformation in culture and attitudes is required to ensure such
inclusive participation. To facilitate the acceptability of women's participation (and even leadership), Nyamu recommends drawing parallels to other
institutions in which women play leading roles, such as in churches and
self-help groups.8 2 In any case, securing inclusive participation at the various levels of norm creation, interpretation, and application requires dedicated advocacy, consensus building, and time.
C.

UN Treaty Body System, Human Rights Implementation and Legal
Pluralism

As illustrated in this first section, traditional dispute resolution mechanisms and customary law are two examples of non-state ordering systems
that can be mobilized to help implement human rights. While some states
(such as India) are indeed already engaging with such normative systems,
the international human rights treaty system continues to be largely focused
on states parties and state law. This is reflected in the UN treaty bodies'
recommendations to states as part of their supervisory role. Some treaty
bodies, such as the Human Rights Committee (HRCee) and the Committee
Against Torture, focus predominately on state law and enforcement,
whereas other bodies can be seen to take a more holistic approach. For
example, the CEDAW Committee and the Committee on the Rights of the
Child (CRC Committee) - while still advocating state law - have also recommended that states parties undertake a variety of other measures to effectively implement human rights standards. Such measures have included
education (including non-formal education); microcredit programs; creating
public dialogue and debate; and the use of theatre, TV programs, art, and

80. Id. at 443; Nyamu-Musembi, supra note 31 at 141. See also CEDAW Committee, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination

against Women - Kenya, 5 April 2011, CEDAW/C/KEN/CO/7, ¶ 41.
81. Nyamu, supra note 17, at 403; Sezgin, supra note 50, at 32.
82. Nyamu-Musembi, supra note 31, at 142-43.
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music. 8 3 Importantly, they have also recommended states cooperate with
civil society organizations and engage local community and religious
groups and leaders. 8 4
However, despite all the UN treaty bodies envisaging implementation
measures other than those based solely on state law to varying degrees, they
still generally address the state as the primary actor. This is an obvious
result of the fact that international law is binding upon the state as the party
to the treaty. However, such a state-centric approach has certain limitations
regarding effective human rights implementation. As reiterated in this section, the state is not necessarily best placed to change a community's norms
that challenge international human rights standards. To be effective, measures implementing human rights need to be initiated by or with the relevant cultural community and to enjoy local legitimacy. On this basis, the
focus of the UN treaty system on the state for human rights implementation
may appear somewhat misplaced. The state measures recommended by the
treaty bodies are top down rather than bottom up, which primafacie suggests that they are unlikely to be embraced by cultural communities when
contrary to local norms.85 As such, UN treaty bodies could do more to encourage states parties to engage with local actors and norms in legally plural settings, and more could be done by states to collaborate with and
support such actors. While the UN General Assembly, CRC Committee,
and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have acknowledged that all members of society have responsibilities regarding the realization of human rights,8 6 more could be done to flesh out these
83. UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and the
Committee on the Rights of the Child, Joint General Recommendation No 31 of the
Committee on the Eliminationof DiscriminationAgainst Women/General Comment No
18 on the Committee on the Rights of the Child on Harmful Practices, ¶1 63 -81,
CEDAW/C/GC31-CRC/C/GC/18 (Nov. 14, 2014).
84. See e.g., Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 5, 11 56
- 59, CRC/GC/2003/5 (Nov. 27, 2003); CEDAW Committee, supra note 80, ¶¶ 18(a),
20(c); CEDAW Committee, supra note 58, ¶118(c), 22(b)-(c); CEDAW Committee,
supra note 36, 1 21(c).
85. Sezgin notes that government interference can invoke "fierce resistance."
Sezgin, supra note 50, at 11-12.
86. Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 5, 1 56, CRC/
GC/2003/5 (Nov. 23, 2003); Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 14 The right to the highest attainablestandard of health (art. 12
ICESCR), 142, E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000); G.A. Res. 53/144, Declarationon the
Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organsof Society to Promote and
ProtectUniversally Recognized Human Rights and FundamentalFreedoms, A/RES/53/
144 (March 8, 1999); G.A. Res. 217 A(III), preamble, (Dec. 10, 1948).
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responsibilities and the relationship between the state and other actors in
society.
For example, the treaty bodies sometimes pass up opportunities to mobilize plural legal systems in the protection of human rights. As an illustration, in response to Kenya's most recent report, the CEDAW Committee
noted their concern "that, while women's access to justice is provided for
by legislation, their ability to exercise that right and bring cases of discrimination before courts is limited by such factors as legal costs, the persistence
of traditional justice systems, illiteracy, lack of information about their
rights, and other practical difficulties in accessing courts." 8 7 As such, they
advised Kenya to educate the public and those working in the justice sector
about CEDAW, to adopt national legal aid, and implement legal literacy
programs.8 8 The CEDAW Committee did not refer further to the role played
by traditional justice systems, thereby failing to engage Kenya on potential
measures to mitigate their negative effects or capitalize on the advantages,
simply requesting them "to take all appropriate measures to remove impediments women may face in gaining access to justice." 89
In response to domestic violence in India, the CEDAW Committee recently recommended, inter alia, legislation (including in relation to victim
reparation) to criminalize marital rape and to provide harsher sentences for
perpetrators of acid attacks.90 Similarly, regarding early and forced marriages, the Committee recommended India pass and implement legislation
and to "effectively investigate, prosecute and punish cases of forced and
early marriage." 91 They only recommended state law solutions, but they did
not refer to other normative systems as a means to protect women's rights
such as the Nai-i Adalat. This is despite the fact that the Committee noted
"the coexistence of multiple legal systems with regard to marriage and family relations in the State party, applying to the various religious groups." 92
The Committee called upon India to ensure equality between men and women in marriage by "[e]nsuring that all the laws on marriage and family
relations governing the various religious groups. . . are in full compliance
with" CEDAW.9 3 Here, taking only a top down approach, the Committee
missed the opportunity to recommend India engage with and mobilize these
87. CEDAW Committee, supra note 80, ¶ 13.
88. Id. at ¶ 14.
89. Id. at ¶ 14(c).
90. They also recommended training for police, crisis shelters and medical assistance for victims. CEDAW Committee, supra note 36, 1 11.
91. Id. at[ 39.
92. Id. at ¶ 40.
93. Id. at ¶ 41(a).
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other systems as a means to promote women's rights within their cultural

context.
The CEDAW Committee has also frequently commented on discrimination regarding women's ownership and inheritance of land. They have
noted their concern that customs and traditional practices in Kenya, Indonesia, and India prevented women from owning or inheriting land and other
property. 9 4 As such, they recommended Kenya establish a legislative framework to increase and strengthen women's participation in designing and
implementing local development plans and "[i]ntroduce measures to address negative customs and traditional practices, especially in rural areas,
95
which affect full enjoyment of the right to property by women." They
urged Indonesia to eliminate this discrimination, to bring all provisions in
line with CEDAW, and to "guarantee equal inheritance rights to women. "96
India was advised to "[a]bolish traditional practices and customs that prevent rural women from inheriting and acquiring land and from fully en97
joying their rights and guarantee land ownership rights to women." Here
again, the Committee identifies competing normative orders as challenging
human rights implementation, but treats the norms as an obstacle to be
overcome (or abolished), rather than an alternative system for states to engage in human rights protection.
However, the CEDAW Committee has, as noted above, also encouraged states parties to promote public dialogue and engage with communities and civil society. For example, the Committee urged India to:
.

initiate and encourage debate within the relevant communities . .
and ... work with and support women's groups as members of these
communities so as to (a) modify social and cultural patterns of conduct to achieve elimination of prejudices and practices based on stereotyped roles for men and women and (b) review and reform
personal laws of different ethnic and religious groups to ensure de
jure gender equality and compliance with the Convention."
Similarly, Indonesia was urged to:

[r]aise awareness of religious groups and leaders about the importance of amending legal provisions; increase support for law reform
through partnerships and collaboration with Islamic jurisprudence research organizations, civil society organizations, women's non-gov94. Id. at ¶ 32; CEDAW Committee, supra note 58, [[ 45(a), 47(d); CEDAW
Committee, supra
95. CEDAW
96. CEDAW
97. CEDAW

note 80, 1 41.
Committee, supra note 80,
Committee, supra note 58,
Committee, supra note 36,

98. Id. at I 11.

¶ 42(a)-(c).
¶¶ 46(a), 48(b).
¶ 33(a).
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emmental organizations and community leaders supportive of the
advancement of women's rights 99
These are very positive recommendations and demonstrate the
CEDAW Committee's understanding of culture's role in human rights and
the interplay of plural legal systems in implementation. 00
However, these recommendations still tend to be made only in second
place, with the primary focus on state legislation and enforcement. For example, as a result of two fatwas by the Council of Ulemas, Indonesia withdrew its ban on FGM/C and permitted circumcision by a medical
practitioner. In response, the CEDAW Committee encouraged Indonesia to
adopt robust legislation criminalizing FGM/C and providing sanctions for
offenders.' 0 The Committee then added that Indonesia should also raise
awareness among religious groups and leaders, and encourage comparative
studies with other groups that do not practice FGM/C.1 02 While this is an
important addition and indicates an awareness of engaging in this manner, it
comes only after the initial focus on state law and criminal sanctions. As
this example shows, Islamic law as determined by the Council of Ulemas
clearly has significant influence in Indonesia and its opposition to a state
law can override those provisions. As such, it is essential (not secondary) to
mobilize that plural legal system in order to arrive at a legitimate and sustainable position against FGMIC in Indonesia.
The analysis in this section indicates that all actors in society can and,
at times, do play an important role in human rights implementation. This is
especially so when overlapping normative orders exist, impacting particular
human rights. While more progressive than some of the other UN treaty
bodies, the CEDAW Committee could be more consistent in engaging with
other normative orders. In this way, and via state mediation, international
law and non-state law can be in conversation, mutually influencing and
shaping one another.1 03 Given international law's focus on the state, it does
99. CEDAW Committee, supra note 58, at ¶ 18(c).
100. Quane argues that the treaty bodies "envisage an inclusive and participatory

law reform process" that "effectively attempts to co-opt these traditional and religious
leaders." See, e.g., Helen Quane, Legal Pluralism and InternationalHuman Rights
Law: Inherently Incompatible, Mutually Reinforcing or Something in Between? 33 OxFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 699, 699-700 (2013).

101. CEDAW Committee, supra note 58, ¶[ 21, 22(a).
102. Id. at [l 22(b)-(c).
103. Quane notes that we are in "the very early stages in this relationship." Helen
Quane, InternationalHuman Rights Law as a Catalystfor the Recognition and Evolution of Non-State Law, in NEGOTIATING STATE AND NON-STATE LAW: THE CHALLENGE
OF GLOBAL AND LOCAL LEGAL PLURALISM 11, 113, 128, 132 (Michael A. Helfand ed.,

2016).
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not deal well with non-state actors or law or their incorporation/co-optation
into the human rights paradigm. Rather than states being the actors and the
rest of society being passive, community members (and not just leaders)
have agency and the ability to contribute, shape, and change local cultural
norms. As an alternative (or in addition) to state legislative intervention in
other normative orders, states should support local actors advocating human
rights solutions within their cultural setting. Such support can include the
state provision of information, education, facilities, and resources including
funding. While such processes may take time, they can contribute to effective human rights implementation by creating the conditions for sustainable
and meaningful change in the relevant normative order. 104 Using other systems than state law to protect human rights may not deliver instant results,
105
In this way,
but that is also frequently the case even when a law is passed.
and
practice
as Nyamu argued, it is possible to realize rights through local
106
custom rather than relying on the national formal legal system.
Similarly, at the adjudication stage, supranational bodies can protect
the rights of cultural communities by recognizing and accommodating nonstate norms. Rather than focusing only on state laws or on state-endorsed
culture to understand the rights of certain individuals and communities, supranational bodies have increasingly been called upon to recognize other
norms in determining cultural claims before them. This is done in a more
explicit manner than in implementation, as members of such cultural communities are parties to the adjudication and place their complaints directly
before the supranational bodies. In this way, they are able to "translate"
their claims across normative systems, in a similar way to which international norms are translated into local system via implementation. The consideration of other norms than state law has been essential in protecting the
rights of various non-dominant groups in adjudication by the Inter-Ameri-

104. Quane iterates the central role of the state under international law in this
process, and the utility of such processes despite the lack of 'quick fix' solutions.
Quane, supra note 100, at 702.
105. Brems argues that "it makes no sense to change the laws if these changes are
not supported by a change in the minds of the people. Therefore, human rights obligations that require profound societal changes should be realized progressively within a
reasonable timeframe." Brems, supra note 21, at 18.
106. Nyamu-Musembi, supra note 31, at 126. Also on the importance of articulating state and non-state forums as a way to advance human rights, see Giselle Corradi,
Can Legal PluralismAdvance Human Rights? How Development Actors Can Contribute 26 EUR J DEV RES 783 (2014) (discussing how international aid actors can engage
with legal pluralism and promote human rights within community structures of dispute
processing).
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can and European Courts of Human Rights. This is considered in more detail in the section below.

II.

LEGAL PLURALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS ADJUDICATION:

POLYPHONY IN THE COURT

ROOM

BEYOND STATE-SANCTIONED

NORMS AND TRADITIONS

Starting from the premise, discussed above, that insights from legal
pluralism are helpful in analyzing the operation of a multi-layered regime of
international human rights law, this second section focuses on supranational
adjudication. Litigation offers a socio-cultural forum for mobilizing different politics, values, and normative orders. As a decision-making process,
litigation is a space of dialogue and power struggles. 07 Through adjudication, several normative postulates compete and contest one another. While
some of them are disregarded, others are appropriated or accommodated by
the adjudicator. In this regard, the Inter-American and the European Courts
of Human Rights (IACtHR and ECtHR, respectively) are no exception.
Moreover, because these courts occupy an intermediate position between
the local and the global, between states and non-state actors, they are well
placed to deal with legal pluralities. In this section, the paper draws attention to issues of normative and cultural recognition from the perspective of
non-dominant actors in litigation. As such, it departs from a focus on the
normative space granted by human rights courts to states and situates nondominant cultural claims within a legal pluralist perspective. This section
discusses the accommodation of those claims by the Inter-American and the
European Courts of Human Rights and the main challenges confronted by
them in doing so. Particular attention is given to the strategic use and navigation of legal claims, the mechanisms used by human rights courts to accommodate non-dominant normative and cultural claims, and the risks and
opportunities arising from the way such courts recognize and accommodate
cultural diversity.
Means of incorporation and recognition of legal pluralities are usually
studied in the framework of the interactions between state and non-state
normative orders, such as when customary or religious laws become part of
state laws by way of legislation or judicial practice. However, it has been
increasingly acknowledged that international human rights courts also have
107. This argument has been mostly advanced in the constitutional context. See
CHRISTOPHER F. ZURN, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF JUDICIAL

REVIEw 242 (2007); Sandra Liebenberg, Engaging the paradoxes of the universaland
particularin human rights adjudication: The possibilitiesand pitfalls of 'meaningful
engagement, 12 AFRICAN Hum. RTS. L.J. 1, 10-11 (2012) (relying on theories of deliberative democracy).

2016-2017]

Cultural Perspectives in Human Rights Norms

97

'

to deal with issues of incorporation of normative communities. This is especially so when those organs are called upon to make human rights standards
reflective of cultural diversity. 08 In the last decades, scholars paid increasing attention to how constitutional and supranational bodies deal with legal
plurality. 109 In this framework, the literature usually elaborates on devices
such as subsidiarity (discussed above), federalism, and the margin of appreciation. 110 Kinley adds to this list of devises the limitation clauses in international treaties, which permit differences pertaining to morality, security,
etc., and the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies, which gives priority to the domestic handling of a complaint before it can be heard at the
international level.11
In order to understand how such legal techniques play out in incorporating or recognizing cultural or normative hybridity, it is useful to consider
the margin of appreciation. The European Court's margin of appreciation is
a well-known example of 'deference' 1 1 2 because the regional order-represented by the European Convention on Human Rights and its monitoring
body, the ECtHR-cedes space to 'another' legal system - in this case, that
of member states- through the upholding of its normative outputs. It is said
13
that in this way the ECtHR allows local normative and cultural variation.
A similar logic -giving space to domestic norms and cultures- underpins the

other legal devices listed above.
It should be observed, however, that the aforementioned tools are primarily concerned with making room for or reconciling the normative variation among constituencies that are institutionally relevant in the current
constitutional and international order. That is, communities represented by,
inter alia, nation-states (and their agents), inter-state bodies and transnational polities (such as the EU). Thus, when it is said that such devices
allow local normative variation, it is important to understand how this attests to an interesting normative interaction that Santos calls dislocation.As
108. Fuentes et al., supra note 6, at 60; Int'l Council on Human Rights Policy,
When legal Worlds Overlap: Human Rights, State and Non-State Law 89 (2009); see
also Roderick A. Macdonald, Pluralistic Human Rights? Universal Human Wrongs?, in
DIALOGUES ON HUMAN RIGHTS

AND LEGAL PLURALISM

15 (Ren6 Provost & Colleen

Sheppard eds., 2013); Oomen, supra note 6, at 432.
109. See Michael Rosenfeld, Rethinking ConstitutionalOrdering in an Era of Legal and Ideological Pluralism, 6 INT'L J. CONST. L, 415, 418 (2008).
110. Id. at 445.
111. Kinley, supra note 20, at 52; see also Berman, supra note 8, at 1209-10.
112. "The State may grant social groups or communities a private legal space, a
process sometimes referred to as 'deference.'" Int'l Council on Human Rights Policy,
supra note 108, at 91.
113. Berman, supra note 8, at 1201; Brems, supra note 21, at 14.
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he explains, with the emergence of supranational laws such as human rights
systems, the position of states has dislocated and acquired a local or infrastate character. It is in that position that nation-states call upon supranational orders to recognize their local normative community.11 4 Yet, we
should not lose sight that from the perspective of many groups and individuals, the state and its laws continue to exercise or consent to their oppression. Further, they may have reason to question how the state defines its
local culture. As a result, such people also turn to supranational orders to
assert their religious, traditional, and other cultural views on human rights,
and they expect those orders to reduce or deny their normative deference
towards the state and rather to incorporate people's cultural claims. Supranational human rights bodies may therefore face demands of normative/
cultural accommodation pulling in opposite directions. Against this backdrop, this section examines how regional human rights courts in Europe and
the Americas accommodate normative and cultural plurality advanced by
those who are usually under-represented within state institutions.
People belonging to ethnic, cultural and religious communities have
brought a number of cases before the ECtHR and the IACtHR. Many of
them assert cultural recognition while contesting socio-economic arrangements. We can think of a number of illustrative cases, such as indigenous
land-related claims based on customary norms and practices; complaints
brought by Roma and Traveler people to accommodate their lifestyle of
living in caravans, whether they are nomadic or not; and cases where women assert recognition of non-official customary and religious marriages to
access pensions granted to widows. These cases, which are discussed in the
sections below, are especially interesting from a legal pluralist perspective.
In the first place, these cases raise important issues of accommodation and
recognition of the commitments governing the lives of applicants with ethnic, religious, and cultural affiliations." 5 Drawing on Tamanaha's categorization, such commitments reflect customary normative orders as well as
community/cultural normative systems." 6 In the words of Malik, they are

114. BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE:
LAW, GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION 94 (2d ed. 2002).

115. For instance, many have questioned their subjection to "general laws and
policies [which] failed to accommodate their particular needs arising from their tradition of living and travelling in caravans." See Beard v. United Kingdom, App. No.

24882/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 130 (2001); Chapman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27238/
95, Eur. Ct. H.R. [ 127 (2001); Coster v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24876/94, Eur. Ct.
H.R. ¶ 139 (2001); Lee v. United Kingdom, App. No. 25289/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 127
(2001).
116. Tamanaha, supra note 1, at 397-99.
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"minority legal orders."'"7 Many of these cases relate to claims for recognition of non-conventional lifestyles, accommodation of non-dominant cultural traditions and practices, as well as incorporation of different
worldviews and norms in state laws. Moreover, some cultural claims have
important material and institutional implications that transcend issues of
symbolic and spiritual preservation of cultural communities or legal
clashes. As will be seen, at the heart of some complaints are entrenched
dynamics of prejudices and discrimination, coupled with tensions between
multi-level government authorities, non-state actors, and trends of
privatization." 8
Thus, these cases confront the two major regional human rights courts
with a complex legal landscape marked by legal overlaps and competing
normative authorities. They disclose the difficult interaction between, for
example, central government legislation and ordinances, local development
plans and regulations, local authorities, and private actors' practices and
interpretations concerning land, social security, family, housing, planning,
property, and environmental protection, as well as communal cultural commitments and customary laws, among others. Rather than applying the law
- the ECHR and the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) - in
a hierarchical fashion to the domestic legal order, judges from the regional
courts must deal with all that normativity and more. Indeed, applicants to
1 19
these courts -through the translation done by lawyers and NGOs - rely
on their affiliation to religion or to Roma and indigenous cultures in the
light of the ECHR and the ACHR. Additionally, they also resort to laws
outside the courts' jurisdiction, such as the Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities, recommendations by the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe, the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, and the ILO Convention No. 169.
It follows that, as in other social fields discussed in the first section,
when it comes to international human rights systems, people not only have

117. Maleiha Malik, Religion and Minority Legal Order, RELIGION, SECULARISM
358, 358-60 (Jean Cohen & C6cile Laborde eds.,

AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY

2016).
118. See, e.g., Robert Home, Gypsies and Travellers in the United Kingdom:
Planning, Housing and Human Rights in a ChangingLegal Regulatory Framework, 20
STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 533, 534 (2009).
119. Lawyers and NGOs are not just "intermediaries who translate global ideas
into local situations" but also "retranslate local ideas into global frameworks." SALLY
ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL
LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE

134 (2006).
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recourse to more than one human rights body (forum shopping), 1 20 but also
they use more than one law to assert their claims depending on context,
strategies, and other factors. Once such claims reach the judicial body, a
number of techniques play out in determining whether and how to recognize and accommodate culturally-based rights claims. The variety of normative claims and sources that can be brought to the supranational fora
injects dynamism into the system, which facilitates the transfer of legal postulates from one struggle to another, serving the interests of different culturally defined groups. At the same time, this dynamism incentivizes these
human rights courts to endorse evolving interpretations that borrow or integrate a variety of norms while accommodating cultural diversity - albeit not
without difficulties. These processes are further discussed below. We start
this discussion by exploring the navigation and appropriation of cultural
claims that depart from state-backed norms on land use and ways of life.
Here, we focus on cases concerning indigenous and Roma/Travelers rights
claims. Next, we discuss other examples concerning state regulations on
marriage and social security vis-a-vis the rights of women committed to
their ethnic and religious affiliations. Subsequently, we explore the mechanisms that have, or might have, assisted human rights courts in accommodating non-dominant cultural diversity. Finally, we reflect upon some of the
challenges involved in these processes of normative interaction and
accommodation.
A.

Dealing with Non-State Norms on Land and Ways of Life:
Indigenous and Roma/JravelersCases

A case in point is to analyze indigenous land rights claims before both
the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights. So long as such
claims assert communal rights based on customary tenure, on the use of
land or even on the spiritual connection with it and its resources, they depart from dominant notions of property and modes of living usually endorsed by states to regulate land and natural resources matters.
In the European context, more than two decades ago, the former European Commission of Human Rights addressed indigenous claims over ancestral land and natural resources in relation to the construction of a
hydroelectric dam on traditional Sami land in Norway.1 21 Although the
Commission did not find for the applicants and reframed their property
120. This is possible because, to use McCruden's words, supranational courts are
"[s]haring [an] overlapping legal space." See Christopher McCrudden, The Pluralismof
Human Rights Adjudication,
MENT

REASONING

RIGHTS. COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL ENGAGE-

3, 6 (Liora Lazarus, Christopher McCrudden & Nigel Bowles eds., 2014).

121. G. and E. v. Norway, App. No. 9278/81 & 9415/8 1, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1983).
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claims as an issue of "private life, family life and home" under Article 8
ECHR, it stated that minorities were, in principle, entitled to claim the right
to respectfor a particularway of life they may lead as private life, family
life, or home. 122 The normative recognition of a traditionalway of life (inclusive of a livelihood deemed culturally relevant) has been linked to the
international protection afforded to the cultural life of minorities, not just in
23
the European system, but also in the UN contextl and the Inter-American
system.
It is well known that the IACtHR has been faced with numerous complaints concerning indigenous and tribal customary rights to ancestral lands
and natural resources, and that it has recognized their traditional communal
rights. In doing so, the Court relied on the right to property in article 21
ACHR, which has been reinterpreted as embracing collective forms of land
ownership based on indigenous usage and customs. In the Court's view,
"disregard for specific versions of use and enjoyment of property, springing
from the culture, uses, customs, and beliefs of each people, would be tantamount to holding that there is only one way of using and disposing of property, which would render protection under article 21 of the Convention
illusory for millions of persons."l 2 4 At the heart of this normative construct
lies the protection of indigenous and tribal people's way of life and their
cultural identity. According to the Court, the starting point of such a particular way of life is their close relation with their traditional lands and natural
resources, "not only because they are their main means of survival, but also
1 25
Interestingly, the
because they form part of [. . .] their cultural identity."
ACHR does not contain a right to cultural identity or integrity, as it is often
recognized in the domestic laws of several American states. However, the
122. Id. at 35.
123. UNCHR Gen. Cmt. No. 23, art. 27, Rights of Minorities, [ 7, CCPRIC/21/
Rev.1 /Add.5 (Apr. 8, 1994); see also MANFRED NOWAK, UN COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 658-64 (2005).
124. Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merit, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) ¶ 120 (Mar. 29, 2006) [hereinafter
Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguay]; Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits
and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 1 161 (June 27, 2012) [hereinafter Sarayaku v. Ecuador]; and, Kuna Indigenous People of Madungandf and the Emberd
Indigenous People of Bayano and their Members v. Panama, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) ¶[ 111 (Oct. 14, 2014) [hereinafter Kuna and the Emberd v. Panama].
125. Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) [ 135 (June 17, 2005) [hereinafter Yakye Axa v. Paraguay];
Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) ¶118 (Mar. 29, 2006); Xdkmok Kdsek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) ¶ 261 (Aug.
24, 2010) [hereinafter Xdkmok Kdsek v. Paraguay].
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Court has not only relied on the concept of cultural identity to sustain a
novel interpretation of the right to property, but has furthermore recognized
a right to cultural (and collective) identity of indigenous communities - and
found that states violated this right.1 26
While the case law on indigenous rights by the ECtHR remains relatively scarce and provides limited insights on the accommodation of indigenous lifestyles and norms, 1 2 7 issues of accommodating a minority way of
life have gained resonance in the Court's jurisprudence regarding Roma and
Travelers. In a number of such cases, nomadic as well as sedentarized
Roma and Travelers turned to the ECtHR to redress evictions or threats of
eviction. Their eviction was usually due to the infringement of land-use
regulations regarding stationing caravans on sites owned, rented or occupied by Roma or Travelers. In response, they claimed that state authorities
failed to accommodate their traditional practice of living in caravans. According to Acton, Caffrey, and Mundy, different normative systems are appropriate for different lifestyles amongst the Roma. The "feud model,"
which generally relies on the nuclear family that constitutes an independent
economic unit, belongs to a more nomadic lifestyle. In turn, the "tribunal
model" fits a more settled and structured lifestyle.1 28 These norms and practices are nonetheless dynamic and adapted over time, especially as a result
of technical and socio-economic changes prompted by neoliberal policies. 129 Of note, some of the factors identified as obstructing the accommodation of Roma's lifestyles are a system of land ownership based on
exclusive occupation that rules out traditional usages of the land, alongside
planning regulations that control land use as a form of development.1 30
In Buckley, the first Roma case decided by the ECtHR, the applicant
claimed that regulations impeding the occupation of her caravan on her own
land violated her right to respect for her home and her right to private and
126. Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 245, 1 213, 217, 220 (June 27, 2012).
127. Cases as decided by the Court on their merits. Timo Koivurova, Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights Regarding Indigenous Peoples: Retrospect and Prospects, 18 INT'L J. MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 1, 8-10 (2011).

128. Thomas Acton, Susan Caffrey & Gary Mundy, Theorizing Gypsy Law, 45
AM. J. COMP. L. 237, 244, 248-249 (1997).
129. On the detrimental impact that the international shift toward neoliberal policies has had on ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples' lives. See, e.g., Nando Sigona
& Nidhi Trehan, Introduction:Romani Politics in NeoliberalEurope, ROMANI POLITICS
IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE: POVERTY, ETHNIC MOBILIZATION, AND THE NEOLIBERAL

ORDER

1, 2-4 (Nando Signona & Nidhi Trehan eds., 2009).

130. Pat Niner, Accommodating Nomadism? An Examination of Accommodation
Options for Gypsies and Travellers in England, 19 HOUSING STUD. 149, 152 (2004).
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family life (Art. 8 ECHR).'1' She contended that this right protected her
32
Gypsy way of life, which involved living in caravans and traveling.1 The
former European Commission found for the applicant, supporting the appli33
cability of the concept of a traditional way of life to the Roma.1 At the
34
time, this legal reasoning was not upheld by the ECtHR.1 It later did so,
establishing the protection of family and private life of a particular cultural
identity as one of the tenets of the ECtHR case law on Roma and Travelers.
The Roma/Gypsy custom of living in caravans and traveling entered the
scope of article 8 ECHR, reshaping the meaning of both "home" and "private and family life."
The cases discussed here also serve to illustrate that the porosity of
both law and culture has made it possible for different actors to strategically
use legal concepts through appropriation and integration of normative postulates that navigate across different settings. A good example is provided
by the legal appeal of a right to protection of a way of life, which has
prompted further navigation of the concept within the European human
rights system. Aside from its application in the context of indigenous, Roma
and Travelers' struggles, the right to a way of life has also been used to
challenge state bans on fox and other animal hunting with dogs. This is an
old traditional practice that persists despite UK laws prohibiting it and the
1 35
Indeed, in a case declared
strong opposition of animal rights defenders.
association from
countryside
a
and
individuals
inadmissible by the ECtHR,
the UK claimed human rights protection of a particular lifestyle encompassing the cultural traditions of rural 'hunting communities' and their economy. 13 6 Regardless of the Court's reasons for declaring the petition
manifestly ill-founded,1 3 7 the case reveals that a wide set of normative
131. ECHR art. 8.
132. Buckley v. United Kingdom, Judgment, App. No. 20348/92, Eur. Ct. H.R.
Dec. & Rep. ¶ 53 (1996).
133. "[The Commission] accepts, as submitted by the applicant, that living in a
caravan home is an integral and deeply-felt part of her gypsy life-style." Id. at ¶ 64.
134. However, the argument did resonate for some judges of the Court who dissented from the majority position. See dissenting opinions of Judge Pettiti, Judge
Lohmus and Judge Repik. See id.
135. For a general overview of the practice and its persistence despite the state
ban. See Laurence Dodds, Ten Years on from the Fox HuntingBan, has Anything Really
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/countryside/
Changed?, THE TELEGRAPH,
(last
11418998/Ten-years-on-from-the-hunting-ban-has-anything-really-changed.html
visited, April 14, 2016).
136. Friend v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27809/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. In 36-38
(2009).
137. The ECtHR basically confined its protection of way of life to that of ethnic or
other 'discrete minority groups' and to activities that were not of a public nature barely
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claims over tradition, practices, and livelihoods may be grounded in the
protection of a particular way of life and cultural identity covered by the
right to private and family life under Article 8 ECHR. This also suggests
that courts will have an increasingly difficult task in justifying which ways
of lives are accommodated or formally recognized - and those that are not.
Likewise, in the Inter-American system, legal postulates on land rights
tied to cultural identity resonate beyond indigenous peoples. Indeed, they
have also been used in the context of afro-descendant rural people claiming
collective rights over land and resources occupied by them, as demonstrated
by the Saramaka and Operation Genesis cases.13 8 Both cases concerned
afro-descendant communities that the Court considered socially and culturally distinguishable from the rest of the state population and, which had,
according to the Court, a special link to the land. In the first case, extractive
industry concessions over the community's land .were granted to private
actors, while in the second case the resident afro-descendant population was
displaced. In both cases, the IACtHR regarded them as 'tribal' peoples and
granted rights accordingly.1 39 In taking this decision, the Court underlined
the state obligation to protect an indigenous-like way of life and cultural
identity.
The extension of indigenous-like protection to afro-descendant rural
people and the Court's definition of Article 21 ACHR as including nonWestern forms of property suggest that the aforementioned norms and interpretations might be taken further and applied to other rights struggles, such
as that of peasants, pastoralists, and other rural communities. 14 0 Such groups
are also in a position to articulate similar legal claims as they have a strong
linked to personal autonomy and identity. It also argued that the ban did not take up the
applicants' employment nor did it stigmatize them in the eyes of society Id. at ¶¶ 43-45.
138. Afro-descendant communities displaced from the Cacarica River Basin. Operation Genesis v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Nov. 20, 2013); Saramaka People v. Suriname,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Nov. 28, 2007).
139. Operation Genesis, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 270, ¶¶ 346-47; and,
Saramaka People, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) Np. 172, 1 80. The Court's interpretation
has been maintained subsequent cases concerning afro-descendant communities. See
e.g. Community Garffuna Triunfo de la Cruz &its members v. Honduras, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Oct. 8, 2015) and Garffuna
Punta Piedra Community and its members v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
(Oct. 8, 2015).
140. The former UN Special Rapporteur for the right to food, for instance, has
addressed this question and called to extend the protection to at least certain traditional
communities that entertain a similar relationship with their ancestral lands, centered on
the community rather than on the individual. Oliver De Schutter (Special Rapporteur on
the Right to Food) The Right to Food, ¶ 13, 26, U.N. Doc. A/65/281 (Aug. 11, 2010).
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cultural connection to the land and its natural resources, and they too endure
dispossession, discrimination, and insecurity in land tenure. Yet, at the
same time, the cultural script of the legal protection developed around indigenous' identity and lifestyle cast doubts on its ability to grant protection
to other rural people who may not fit the protected cultural identity. This
potential exclusionary effect attests to the problem generated when courts
essentialize culture and identity in order to protect them. This issue is discussed further in section III below.
B.

Dealing with Non-State Norms on Marriage and Religion: Cases
Concerning Women's Rights

Other relevant cases from the ECtHR are those regarding the granting
of legal effects to non-official marriages performed according to the cultural
affiliation of the applicants. In Mudloz Diaz v. Spain, a widow, who married
under Roma rites, claimed recognition of her marriage and the ensuing survivor pension granted by the state following the death of the spouse. She
was unsuccessful in her claims for equal recognition of her Roma marriage.
The ECtHR found no obligation in that respect for the respondent state.
However, the ECtHR also held that the state's refusal to recognize the effects of the Roma marriage for the purposes of the survivor's pension was
disproportionate. Remarkably, it provided that "the force of the collective
beliefs of a community that is well-defined culturally cannot be ignored."'41
In addition to the applicant's belief in the validity of her marriage celebrated according to the rites and traditions of the Roma minority to which
she belonged, the Court stressed that such rites and traditions were not disputed or regarded as being contrary to public order by the state. Key to the
Court's reasoning was also Spain's prior acknowledgement of a widow's
entitlement to a survivor's pension in cases where the marriage was not
valid but there was a good faith belief in the existence of a marriage. Furthermore, the Court relied on Spain's several official acts of recognition of
the marital status of the applicant. These state-sanctioned forms of recognition appeared very relevant for the ECtHR to accept the claim that the union
celebrated under Roma norms should at least generate a legal entitlement to
survivor pension.1 4 2

141. Mutioz Dfaz v. Spain, App. No. 49151/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 59 (2009).
142. There are other cases in which it is possible to appreciate the Court's deference regarding state acts of recognition of legal plurality. For instance, in Kdroly Nagy
v. Hungary (which concerned a compensation claim against the Hungarian Calvinist
Church following the dismissal of a pastor of the Godoll"o parish) the ECtHR noted
that "excluding claims based on ecclesiastical law from the jurisdiction of State courts
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Not very long after, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR ruled on a very
similar complaint in erife Yifit v. Turkey. The facts in this case were for
the most part analogous to those in Mufioz D(az, with the important difference that the applicant had married according to Islamic rites. At first
glance, the case of Mrs. Yigit might appear as not being so much about the
accommodation of non-dominant cultural claims, as it was the case of Mrs.
Mufioz in the Spanish context. This is on account of the fact that Islam is
the religion of the large majority of Turkey's population. Yet, the erife
Yigit case is still relevant for the analysis undertaken here. Besides tensions
and power struggles between secularists and religious groups in Turkey, it
should be recalled that Muslims are certainly a non-dominant minority in
the context of Europe. As such, the Court's view on Islam-related rights
claims, even in the context of Turkey, are significant for whether and how
the ECtHR and other countries will accommodate Muslims' needs and concerns. Moreover, the specific situation of Mrs. Yigit was one of considerable vulnerability, and her complaint in any case concerned the tension
between her cultural and normative commitments and those of the state.
Observing that Turkey, unlike Spain, had not given any official recognition to any form of non-civil law marriage, the Court found that Mrs.
Yigit, had no legitimate expectation of obtaining a survivor's pension and
social security benefits on the basis of her "partner's" entitlement. Furthermore, the ECtHR attached considerable weight to the specific socio-cultural
context invoked by the state, particularly with regard to Islam. In fact, in
addition to the importance Turkey accorded to the principle of secularism,
the Court noted that this state "aimed to put an end to a marriage tradition
which places women at a clear disadvantage, not to say in a situation of
dependence and inferiority, compared to men." 43 The Court assessed the
state's refusal to recognize religious marriages in light of the prohibition of
polygamy and the respect for gender equality. In other words, the refusal to
recognize the applicant's religious marriage for the purposes of a survivor
pension ultimately rested on the state's and the Court's views of the merits
and value of Islam. Interestingly, the Court's appraisal of Islam does not
appear to incorporate the viewpoint of religious women such as Mrs. Yigit,
but rather seems to uphold a stereotypical idea of what Islam entails for
Muslim women. Thus, paradoxically, it remains unclear whether the
ECtHR considered the impact of the legal position it adopted upon Mrs.
Yigit in particular and Muslim women in general. Lacking access to social
security rights, after having taken care of the home, the deceased spouse
does not violate Article 6 § 1 of the Convention [right to access to court]." Kiroly Nagy
v. Hungary, App. No. 56665/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 73 (2015).
143. Serife Yigit v. Turkey [GC], App. No. 3976/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 81 (2010).
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and six children, Muslim women like Mrs. Yigit, were actually the most
burdened by the legal solution.144
Finally, it is noteworthy that in Muffoz Diaz as well as some other
cases regarding land-use permission for Roma and Travelers' caravans, the
ECtHR conceded that:
while the fact of belonging to a minority does not create an exemption from complying with marriage laws [or planning laws in the case
of caravans], it may have an effect on the manner in which those laws
are applied. [... .] the vulnerable position of Roma [and here we could
also think of other social groups] means that some special consideration should be given to their needs and their different lifestyle both in
the relevant regulatory framework and in reaching decisions in particular cases. 14 5
But how do human rights courts assess the extent to which states have
taken steps to incorporate and give consideration to those views and needs?
In cases like the ones discussed above, one may ask the extent to which
courts could examine whether other measures less rights-restrictive could
have been adopted or explored, such as equalizing the legal effects of longlasting cohabitation or encouraging civil registration of different forms of
marriage. For instance, in cases dealing with the eviction of Roma and
Travelers, inquires could determine whether enabling common sites, providing alternative pitches for parking caravans, or even regularizing informal Roma settlements were considered. In both kinds of cases, questions of
governmental dialogue or engagement with the communities at stake might
also be a matter for judicial consideration.
C.

Mechanisms to Recognize and Accommodate Non-Dominant Norms
and CulturalPractices

The cases examined thus far underscore the extent and the way in
which non-dominant cultural claims have penetrated the judicial interpretation of human rights courts. They gave rise, for instance, to a collective
right to land and natural resources, as well as a right to cultural identity and
144. For a critical view on the approach taken by the Court in this respect, see the
comment by Saila Ouald Chaib at the Strasbourg Observers Blog. Saila Ouald Chaib,
Serife Yigit v. Turkey: The Court did it Again!, STRASBOURG

OBSERVERS

(Nov. 10,

2010), http://strasbourgobservers.com/2010/11/10/serife-yigit-v-turkey-the-court-did-itagain.

145. See Mutioz Dfaz, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 61 (2009); Connors v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 66746/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶84 (2004); Chapman v. United Kingdom, App. No.
27238/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶96 (2001); Winterstein and Others v. France, App. No. 27013/
07 Eur. Ct. H.R. [ 76 (2013).
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to a traditional lifestyle. If we were to stick to the idea that human rights
law is what the drafters originally wrote or what a group of sovereign states
originally agreed upon, it would be difficult to explain those normative developments. The idea of interacting and evolving laws, as offered by a legal
pluralist approach, is much more useful to understand the dynamism of the
rights enshrined in human rights treaties, which take divergent and particular meaning in certain contexts. In some of the above examples, the European and Inter-American courts aimed at giving their respective
conventions effective force in contemporary circumstances of cultural and
normative plurality. In several of the cases revised both Courts relied, although perhaps to different degrees, on a variety of normative sources: international, regional, national, and even non-state law. In this regard, it is
important to consider that litigants (in their quality of "translators") play a
key role in integrating a vast set of norms into the adjudicating setting.
Regarding the IACtHR's evolutionary interpretation of the ACHR, the
integration of international norms outside the Inter-American context has
played out significantly. The IACtHR has relied on the International Labour
Organization's Convention No. 169 concerning indigenous and tribal peoples in independent countries and other general and specific instruments,
some of which were considered even if the state in question had not ratified
them. The Court has also referred to domestic laws and, more importantly,
to indigenous laws and customs. Throughout the process, the Court is
guided by an interpretation pro-personae, according to which the Convention provisions should be read in the way that is most protective of human
rights. 146
Similarly, the ECtHR also appears influenced by other international
sources, although most of them are state-generated. The ECtHR considers,
for instance, the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, the European Social Charter, Resolutions and Recommendations of the Committee of Ministers, and the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe. It has also considered decisions from the European Committee of Social Rights, and General Comments of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. On several occasions, the
Court has also referred to the ECHR as "a living instrument." Albeit the
Court often uses the living instrument doctrine to highlight common normative developments within the Council of Europe (which evokes a sense of
legal homogeneity rather than plurality), the appeal of the living instrument
doctrine to a broader set of norms has been employed to justify a departure

146. See, e.g., Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, 11125-30 (June 17, 2005).
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47
from the cultural and normative setting prevailing in the responded state.1
It follows that the living instrument device may be of particular relevance to
uphold or accommodate cultural and normative claims that do not enjoy
state recognition. Moreover, the living instrument approach is also important to consider in the context of human rights implementation, as cultural
norms are dynamic and therefore the implementation measures based upon
them need to be revisited to ensure that they remain relevant and up-to-date.
One may therefore argue that an "integrated perspective to human
rights" 148 facilitated the cultural re-signification of legal concepts (e.g.,
property, home, family life) and the accommodation of non-dominant
group's norms and commitments. Although the idea of integration in human
14 9
rights law is usually seen as standing in opposition to legal pluralism, the
jurisprudence examined here suggests that bringing in a broad range of relevant norms may assist courts and litigants in accounting for particular normative and cultural demands. In this sense, integrating human rights norms
in an interpretive process does not necessarily produce, harmonized, or uniform normative outcomes. 150 Equally in the case of implementation, different normative orders may be integrated to deliver a unique measure that
protects the right in question in that context. Recalling that cultural systems
are in perpetual evolution, the fact that normative systems influence and
shape one another is not problematic. On some occasions, one system or
the other may be effective, however, novel measures (like the Nari Adalat)
could be created by integrating normative systems.
Furthermore, the case law examined also shed light on the importance
of participatory mechanisms. An outstanding approach in this respect is that
adopted by the IACtHR in indigenous land rights cases, where it has considered that engagement with the affected communities themselves allows
each relevant actor to define and advance their interests and needs. This is
reflected in the state duty to ensure informed prior consultation on matters
affecting indigenous communities and even their free prior informed con-

147. George Letsas, The ECHR as a living instrument: its meaning and legitimacy, in CONSTITUTING EUROPE: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NA-

112 (Andreas Follesdal et al. eds., 2013)
(referring to the third pattern disclosed by the Court's early case law which portrayed
the convention as a living instrument. The author regards the use of present-day developments in the Council of Europe as a counterweight to the moral climate prevailing on
the respondent state as "the central feature of evolutive interpretation as applied by the
old Court.")
148. Eva Brems, Should Pluriform Human Rights become one? Exploring the
benefits of Human Rights Integration, 4 EUROPEAN J. Hum. RTs. 447, 451-456 (2014).
149. Oomen, supra note 6, at 484.
TIONAL, EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL CONTEXT

150. Brems, supra note 148, at 469.
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sent in certain circumstances.' 5' This is a valuable tool for bridging the legal
and cultural worlds of the parties at stake. By requiring states to undertake a
process of dialogue, the IACtHR fosters an encounter between the abstract/
universal human rights, the state normative order, and the particular needs,
values, and norms of indigenous and tribal people. Participation can also
mitigate the objectivizing force of the legal process over cultural identity
claims, as those belonging to the cultural group in question will be able to
define and contest what is regarded as their culture.
By encouraging states to use participatory methods, human rights
courts may contribute to a more dialogical construction of rights, which is
something that should not be confined only to indigenous or tribal people's
cases. Dialogical mechanisms may be helpful in a number of different situations, such as in cases of informal settlements and forced eviction, which
underlie the plight of many Roma and Travelers,1 52 or in cases concerning
religious claims. It follows then that the ECtHR could also benefit from
promoting the use of participatory mechanisms. In doing so, the Court
might endorse a sort of indigenous-like consultation requirement, or introduce this as a procedural safeguard or as an element in its proportionality
analysis. The ECtHR could, for instance, take into account the extent to
which state authorities and the affected communities have endeavored to
find solutions through dialogue, or it may weigh up evidence provided by
empirical studies based on the views of those concerned.1 53
This also applies to human rights implementation, and some rights specifically require a state to involve the public through consultation and participation when implementing rights, such as the right to health.1 54 Public
participation is an important way to achieve community buy-in or endorsement, and promote the effectiveness of an implementation measure. This is
particularly important given that in many states (especially post-colonial
states), the state itself may not be the locus of authority and the participation of certain actors who do hold such authority (like the Council of
Ulemas in Indonesia) is crucial. The UN treaty bodies have recognized the
151. Saramaka People v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶¶ 134-37 (Nov. 28, 2007).
152. On the use of consultation like mechanisms, see, e.g., Comm. On Econ., Soc.
& Cultural Rights, International Movement ATD Fourth World Against France, ¶ 78,
No. 33/2006 (Dec. 5, 2007); UN Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Forced
Evictions, and the Right to Adequate Housing, 1 14, 16 UN Doc. E/i 998/22 (May 20,
1997); see also Liebenberg, supra note 106, at 26.
153. For this it would be of course necessary that litigants incorporate this kind of
material into the judicial setting.
154. Comm. On Econ., Soc. & Culture Rights, The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health ¶¶ 11, 17 Doc. E/C. 12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000).
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importance of public dialogue and participation, and often calls states to
engage thoroughly with civil society, community and religious leaders
when implementing human rights.
Finally, Serife, Yigit, Mufloz, Diaz, and some of the cases discussed
above also provide the scope to consider the benefits of two normative tools
devised within the framework of equality and non-discrimination: intersectionality and the prohibition of indirect discrimination. Both of these tools
may facilitate a better handling of legal hybridity. In the first place, the
notion of intersectionality acknowledges a reality where individuals are
crossed by many identities, feel bound to several communities, and suffer
simultaneously different forms of oppression.1 5 5 For example, those who
petitioned the Nari Adalats for redress would typically suffer multiple
forms of oppression based on being women, poor, and uneducated. The
intersectional approach focuses on the unique types of violations occurring
at the intersections of various systems of subordination. 1 5 6 These may certainly include cultural and normative structures. Furthermore, by recognizing a person's multiple identities and community affiliations, the need to
take heed of the various normative and cultural orders involved becomes
more evident.
The notion of indirect discrimination also helps to address questions of
legal plurality and cultural diversity. The prohibition of indirect discrimination casts as impermissible laws or regulations that, despite being neutral in
their formulation and general in their application, are, in practice, liable to
157
As adhave a particularly disadvantageous impact on certain groups.
dressed in this paper, this includes (internally diverse) groups such as women, Muslims, and Roma and Travelers. Hence, as observed by Ast, this
legal tool may call for the introduction of exceptions or flexible legal regimes to cope with diverse social realities.15 8 It may also alert us to care155. In this vein, Bond who explains how intersectionality enriched the understanding of women's experiences who, at the time of the drafting of CEDAW, were not
viewed as members of cultural communities. Johanna E. Bond, Women's Rights, Customary Law and the Promise of the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, THE
FUTURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 467, 474 (Jeanmarie Fenrich et al. eds., 2011).
156. Johanna E. Bond, InternationalIntersectionality:A Theoretical and Pragmatic Exploration of Women's InternationalHuman Rights Violations, 52 EMORY L.J.
71, 157-158 (2003).
157. INTER-RIGHTS, NON-DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. A HANDBOOK
FOR PRACTITIONERS 70 (2011); OLIVIER DE SCHUTrER, THE PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION UNDER EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: RELEVANCE FOR THE
CRIMINATION DIRECTIVES - AN UPDATE 23 (2011).

EU

NON-Dis-

158. Fr6d6rique Ast, EuropeanLegal FrameworkResponding to Diversity andthe
Need for Institutional Change. Indirect Discriminationas a Means of Protecting Plu-
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fully scrutinize the invocation of contextual factors -such as prevailing
ideologies or social customs- to justify the refusal to accommodate other
cultural claims and norms. These concerns regarding intersectionality and
indirect discrimination are relevant in the adjudication of human rights and
the implementation processes discussed above. For example, while women
may theoretically have the same access to state courts for dispute resolution
as men, in practice, they are not able to access the courts and receive
favorable outcomes to the same extent as men.
Without downplaying the complexities of accommodating non-dominant religious or other culturally motivated practices in a given society, the
cases reviewed here raise the issue of how to deal with the social reality of
religious and cultural communities who abide by their customs and norms
in plural legal situations. They also present the question of how courts and
other supervisory bodies may do so without taking the role of defining and
fixing the meaning and value of a given culture or identity, or without foreclosing opportunities of empowerment for the people concerned. We turn to
some of these challenges in the next section.

III.

SOME

CHALLENGES IN ACCOUNTING FOR NORMATIVE

PLURALITY AND NON-STATE CULTURAL CLAIMS

The analysis conducted in the previous sections inevitably leads us to
assess normative discourses over tradition, culture, and way of life, which
entail political, social, and legal implications. In this part of the paper we
sketch a few of them, namely, cultural essentialism, group boundaries, and
the limitation of opportunities for further empowerment. These issues all
arise in the process of human rights implementation and adjudication involving plural normative orders.
Initially, the ECtHR in a number of cases reduced the protection of a
"Gypsy way of life" mainly to the occupation of caravans and nomadism.
While the Court acknowledged that many Roma no longer live a nomadic
life, 159 it noted that applicants appeared not to be pursuing an itinerant lifestyle, which meant that the case was not about "the traditional itinerant
Gypsy lifestyle." 60 Even if this constitutes a fair legal simplification of
ralism: Challenges and Limits, in INSTITUTIONAL ACCOMMODATION AND THE CITIZEN:
LEGAL AND POLITICAL INTERACTION IN A PLURALIST SOCIETY 85, 86-88 (2009).

.

159. See, e.g., Chapman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27238/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶
73 (2001); Beard v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24882/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. [ 84 (2001);
Coster v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24876/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 87 (2001).
160. Chapman, App. No. 27238/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 105; Beard, App. No. 24882/
94, Eur. Ct. H.R. [ 116; Coster, App. No. 24876/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 119; Lee v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 25289/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. [ 107 (2001);
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Roma and Travelers' culture, the characterization has its risks. As observed
by Poulter in the British context, the definition of Roma along nomadic
61
lines is mostly a legal creation of policy-makers and judges.1 Moreover,
"by defining Travelers by what they do (or by folkloric expectations of their
behavior) the state has retained the power to control their use of the land,
differentiate their authentication and respond to the prejudices of the majority population."l 62 Nomadism, in fact, does not adequately reflect the lived
experience of many Roma and Travelers, nor is its protection instrumental
to achieve (better) justice. Protecting a Gypsy lifestyle to the extent that it is
nomadic excludes many sedentarized Roma who continue to regard the use
of mobile homes as a central part of their experience. Further, recognition
on the basis of nomadism exposes Roma and Travelers to greater socioeconomic disadvantage as itinerancy confines them to a life that is no
longer economically viable.1 63 Fortunately, however, the ECtHR has moved
away from the emphasis on nomadism,1 64 which nonetheless remains an
important criterion in state regulations.
An additional problem may arise in terms of who is entitled to protection. In fact, conferring rights to the extent that a certain cultural script is
met implies that many may not be able to live up to the cultural or normative tradition legally recognized. This difficulty, linked to the question of
essentialism, materializes in fixed group or cultural boundaries. Thus, for
example, in deciding the inadmissibility of an application submitted by a
"[n]ew [t]raveler," the ECtHR recalled that these people, unlike Gypsies by
birth, live a nomadic lifestyle through personal choice and not on account of
being born into any ethnic or cultural group. Accordingly, it was doubtful
whether new Travelers who choose that lifestyle would be entitled to the
65
protection afforded to true Gypsies or Travelers.1 A preference for inner
traits, like in this case, is relevant to the question of how the law -in this
case human rights law- deals with diversity. Such a preference actually en161. See

SEBASTIAN POULTER, ETHNICITY, LAW, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EN-

GLISH EXPERIENCE

162.

541 (1998); Robert Home, supra note 118, at 538 (2009).
supra note 161, at 541.

POULTER,

163. THE TRAVELLER MOVEMENT, A PLACE TO CALL HOME: ETHNICITY, CULTURE
AND PLANNING FOR TRAVELLER SITES 3-4, 8 (2014).

&

164. Connors v. United Kingdom, App. No. 66746/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 93 (2004).
For a more recent example of how the Court affords protection to settled Travelers
living in mobile homes, see Winterstein v. France, App. No. 27013/07, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2013).
165. Horie v. United Kingdom, App. No. 31845/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶[¶ 28-29
(2011). On this case see Lourdes Peroni and Alexandra Timmer. Lourdes Peroni
Alexandra Timmer, Gypsy Way of Life "By Birth" or "By Choice," STRASBOURG OnSERVERS (Feb. 22, 2011), http://strasbourgobservers.com/category/cases/horie-v-uk.
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tails an assimilationist bias. As explained by Yoshino, when courts protect
traits that cannot be changed (e.g., skin color or ethnic ascendancy), but do
not do so for characteristics that individuals are able to modify (e.g., dress,
the way of life, or the religion one practices), then an individual's only
alternative is conformity to the dominant norms. 166 Supervisory bodies thus
need to be aware of the cultural character of any form of social categorization and of its effects, including those they make in the course of adjudicating and implementing human rights norms.
The IACtHR, in turn, also discloses a rather essentialist cultural view
in a number of judgments in which it characterizes the ties between indigenous/tribal peoples and their ancestral territories. The Court has consistently
referred to traditional uses and customs. The examples given by the Court
include ceremonial activities, languages, arts and rituals, practices in connection with nature, customary law, dress, seasonal or nomadic hunting,
fishing or gathering, and use of natural resources associated with their customs or other elements characteristic of their culture.1 67 Like in the cases
discussed above, this also brings risks of essentialism and group boundaries. This discourse may force indigenous populations to present themselves
according to a frozen cultural lifestyle in order to secure protection for their
rights, while also reducing the possibilities that peasants and other rural
communities, who may legitimately articulate similar demands to collective
lands, could benefit from a rights framework whose cultural imprint they
may not meet. Additionally, as noted by some scholars, this portrait of indigenous identity/culture may also entail economic and political drawbacks,
such as foreclosing opportunities for the communities who may wish to
benefit from non-traditional practices or techniques for managing or exploiting their natural resources.1 6 8 The IACtHR has even suggested that certain special safeguards to regulate the restriction of indigenous peoples'
collective property would only be applicable to those resources traditionally
used by the community and which are vital to their survival and way of
life. 169 These cases, therefore, provide some insight to the dangers of lock166. Kenji Yoshino, Pressureto Cover, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006, at 4.
167. Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) 1 148 ( June 27, 2012); Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs,

Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) ¶ 154 (June 17, 2005).
168. Ariel E Dulitzky, When Afro-Descendants Became "Tribal Peoples": The
Inter-American Human Rights System and Rural Black Communities I UCLA J. INT'L
L. & FOREIGN AFF. 29, 47-48 (2010); Thomas M. Antkowiak, Rights, Resources, and
Rhetoric: Indigenous Peoples and the Inter-American Court, 35 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 113,
161 (2013).
169. Such safeguards are (1) the community's effective participation; (2) independent environmental and social impact assessment; and (3) reasonable benefit sharing.
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ing indigenous people and members of other ethnic communities into their
traditional cultures and norms- and ignoring the inherent dynamism of all
cultures and normative systems.
Equally in the case where non-state norms are used to implement
human rights, members of cultural communities should not be locked into
this identity and normative system. In order to ensure human rights protection and access to effective remedies, it is crucial that state functions and
interventions are not dispensed with altogether. It is important that, for example, women can continue to be able to forum shop and to select the system (formal or informal) and the norms (state or non-state) - or a
combination thereof - that best support their rights. Women in cultural communities need to be able to 'opt-out' of their customary system if necessary
70
As such, the state cannot leave matters entirely to the system
or desirable.o
of local norms, but needs to provide safeguards, supervision, and remedies
where women's rights are not protected - as is their responsibility under
international law. Yet, it is recommended that when states provide for these
responsibilities, they recognize the crucial role of other norms and to engage with them.
Of course, the law works through categorizations and therefore it is
very difficult to devoid the adjudication and implementation processes from
their essentializing force. Yet it is important to note that the aforementioned
risks arise despite the cultural essentialism being premised on a certain positive or valued account of the identities at stake, as that appears to be the
Courts' view of Roma and indigenous cultures. There are, however, other
instances where the judicial essentialization of a given culture or identity
conveys harm in itself, as it occurs where courts rest on a negative stereotype of a given culture or identity. This is well illustrated by the ECtHR's
depiction of Islam in the case of erife Yigit v. Turkey. It is equally illustrated in the example of customary law adapting to provide for women's
inheritance, where the state and UN treaty bodies had deemed the system
incompatible with women's rights standards. As noted in the first section,
the treaty bodies at times have essentialized culture, interpreting it as static
and uniform when in fact it is changing and varied. To avoid issues of
essentialism and exclusion, those within the cultural communities are best
placed to articulate their norms, and such a process of articulation should be
inclusive of all community members. This is also vital given that all cultural
See Saramaka People v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations, and Cost, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) ¶ 155 (Nov. 28, 2007). For a critique on this, see Antkowiak, supra
note 166, at 167.
170. Yvonne Donders, Do cultural diversity and human rights make a good
match?, 61 INT'L Soc. Sci. J. 15, 18 (2010); see also Sezgin, supra note 50, at 29.
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systems are constantly evolving. As a consequence, states as well as supervisory bodies should be careful to refrain from essentializing culture, or
making outside determinations of such norms for the purposes of human
rights implementation and adjudication.
Finally, some of the examples discussed above regarding human rights
implementation via non-state, normative systems also raise problematic issues of empowerment. As noted, the Nari Adalat have been criticized for
not challenging the patriarchy enough and, even once reformed, traditional
Adat law in Bali still did not provide for women's equal inheritance with
men. As this demonstrates, there can be a limit on the agency of community
members to reform their own systems to better protect human rights, and
sometimes a persistent reluctance of systems to such change. As such, there
is still a role for the state in meeting the challenges of navigating plural
legal systems regarding human rights. These problems also demonstrate
that no one system will necessarily provide all the solutions, and that legally
plural situations are complex, multifaceted, and sensitive. Therefore, while
the assertion of cultural commitments through human rights law have found
their way before supranational human rights bodies, the increasing leverage
of cultural claims has brought about important challenges that require these
bodies to be careful in their methods and reasoning for accommodating cultural diversity.
CONCLUSIONS

As demonstrated in this paper, legal pluralism can assist in understanding the link and interaction between human rights and culture as normative
orders with overlapping subject matters. In both human rights implementation and adjudication, the legal pluralist perspective reveals the competition
and contestation between local, national, and also international norms. This
dynamic is apparent through the process of international human rights supervision via the UN treaty bodies and the regional courts in Europe and
Latin America. This paper explored how a legal pluralist perspective can
reveal opportunities and challenges for the effective implementation and
adjudication of cultural rights claims raised by non-dominant groups.
The first section examined how different normative orders may assist
to more effectively implement human rights standards. It contended that
mobilizing non-state dispute resolution mechanisms and non-state law
could work to help protect women's rights regarding domestic violence and
property. To be most effective, implementation measures need to be tailor
made to each situation, catering for the particular issues and actors involved. Given the role of culture in human rights, effective implementation
measures in one setting may be ineffective in another given the variety of
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competing normative systems. This fact favors local over national implementation measures where possible, reflecting the fact that human rights are
not one size fits all. This underscores the need for a diversity of human
rights implementation measures, both within and between states. Human
rights law creates space for and also welcomes such diversity. The human
rights treaty bodies accept a variety of implementation measures and human
rights courts increasingly engage in responding to claims that attempt to
make human rights standards reflective of cultural diversity. This applies to
the cultural and normative particularism raised by states parties, but also to
cultural claims advanced by non-dominant actors. Despite this, we argued
that in their supervision of state compliance with human rights standards,
the UN treaty bodies fail to consistently engage meaningfully with nonstate normative systems. As such, the treaty bodies are called upon to more
thoroughly and consistently consider implementation beyond the possibilities offered by state law and institutions. As already cautioned, this does not
mean dispending with state functions. Rather, the suggestion advanced is
that while in principle the role of "all organs of society" in protecting and
promoting human rights has been recognized internationally, treaty bodies
are yet to fully engage with it and states to fully operationalize it.
The second section argued that the legal pluralist lenses are useful to
understand questions of normative space and cultural diversity beyond state
claims of deference before supranational human rights courts. Exploring
several illustrative cases concerning people with indigenous, ethnic, and religious affiliation before regional courts demonstrated how cultural rights
claims that evoke non-dominant normative commitments have gained currency and been used strategically by different actors. The ECtHR and
IACtHR have incorporated or accommodated some of these claims. In that
context, certain mechanisms appear particularly well placed to deal with the
normative hybridity at stake. This is the case for interpretative techniques
that regard human rights treaties as living instruments or that resort to a
wide set of relevant norms, including transnational rules and norms with a
local and customary character. Here again, as with implementation, a conversation is apparent between international, national, and non-state law as
mediated by the regional court. Additionally, for both the adjudication and
implementation of human rights, participatory mechanisms that allow a
more dialogical and context-sensitive construction of rights have also
proven valuable to address normative and cultural diversity. Due to this, it
has been argued that dialogical devices could be further promoted and utilized by human rights bodies. A similar claim has been advanced regarding
the application of an intersectional approach and the prohibition of indirect
discrimination.
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As argued in this paper, there are numerous mechanisms in international law to engage with and incorporate non-state law and plural legal
systems. These are important in order to better protect the rights of those
who belong to cultural minorities and non-dominant groups. These mechanisms may serve to counteract some of the critical challenges offered by the
normative discourses on culture and tradition adopted by supervisory bodies
for the purposes of implementing and adjudicating human rights in culturally-sensitive matters. The challenges include the risk of essentializing culture or making outside determinations of its norms; drawing exclusionary
boundaries among groups or cultures; and overlooking issues of socio-economic disempowerment. While avoiding these pitfalls is not a straightforward task, an important first step is to interrogate the operation of
international human rights law in light of cultural norms that co-exist with
state-sanctioned laws and traditions. Despite international law's tendency to
focus on the state as its subject, recognition of other actors and norms is
increasing and expanding the dialogue on what human rights are in practice.

